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Abstract
This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded
goods like hazardous waste. If waste disposers of a small open economy are
judgement-proof, then the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the
factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the optimal extension
is partial at most. However, extending liability increases incentives of the
waste importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Interaction through
the price system and through contracts that condition payments for disposal
services on the occurrence of an accident yield identical outcomes if disposers
are judgement-proof.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods.
A pertinent example concerns liability for damages that are caused by hazardous
waste exports. During the 1980s, costs of waste disposal increased substantially in
many OECD countries. Consequently, exports of hazardous wastes accelerated. It
was widely perceived that this constituted a particular threat to developing coun-
tries who often lack the administrative, financial and technical capacities to ensure
the environmentally sound disposal of hazardous waste (Strohm 1993; Montgomery
1995).1
Subsequent international negotiations led to the adoption of the ‘Basel Conven-
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal’ (1989), who’s central element is the requirement that waste exporters must
obtain the ‘prior informed consent’ of importers.2 Ten years later, the Convention
was supplemented by the ‘Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation’ (1999).
While the Protocol holds waste exporters liable, it does so only for accidents that
occur during the shipment of waste. In particular, Article 4.1 (Strict Liability) states
that waste exporters “shall be liable for damage until the disposer has taken pos-
session of the hazardous wastes and other wastes. Thereafter the disposer shall be
liable for damage.”
This provision has been criticized by some observers. The apprehension is that
disposers will not take adequate care if they are judgement-proof. In national law,
similar concerns have led to an extension of liability to lenders of judgement-proof
firms, most notably with the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in the US (see, e.g., Boyer and Laffont 1996).
Hence, the question arises whether exporters of hazardous waste should be subjected
to extended liability for damages that occur during waste disposal, but that are not
covered by the disposers themselves.
I investigate this issue from the perspective of a small open economy with two
1Some sensational incidents reinforced this view. One example concerns a Nigerian farmer who
rented his land to an Italian company that deposited barrels with highly toxic polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB) and asbestos. Some barrels burst and local people, being unaware of the toxic
load, even used them to store water (Logan 1991).
2Especially developing countries argued that an improved exchange of information is insufficient
to control the risks that are associated with hazardous waste exports. In 1995, this led to a decision
by the Parties to the Basel Convention to completely ban such exports from developed to developing
countries. However, countries are reluctant to ratify the ban, which has not yet entered into force.
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production activities. Firstly, the economy produces waste disposal services which
are partly sold to waste exporters (i.e. importers of disposal services). Secondly,
the economy produces a final consumption good which uses disposal services as an
input. Waste disposal may lead to environmental accidents so that expected damage
costs depend on two factors: the size of the disposal sector and the care chosen by
disposers.
Various cases are considered. Firstly, I distinguish whether waste exporters and
disposers interact through the price system, or through contracts that condition pay-
ments for waste disposal on the occurrence of an accident. The disposers’ choice of
care, however, is never contractible because it cannot be observed or verified. Sec-
ondly, I assume that disposers are judgement-proof for either of the two following
reasons: Disposers may not have sufficient assets to compensate the victims. Alter-
natively, regulatory provisions may limit compensatory payments to the victims. For
example, the Protocol on Liability and Compensation stipulates only a lower limit
for disposer liability of currently 2 million Special Drawing Rights for any one inci-
dent (Annex B). Especially in developing countries, governments may face political
difficulties to increase liability above this required minimum.
Besides deriving policy recommendations for the specific problem of hazardous
waste trade, the paper contributes to the wider literature on extended liability and
judgement-proof firms. For a moral hazard framework with a potentially judgement-
proof firm that is similar to the one analyzed in this paper, Pitchford (1995) has
shown that the (second best) optimal extension of liability is partial. The reason
is that a waste exporter will demand financial compensation for the extension of
liability upon it. If the disposer’s wealth constraint binds, the exporter can do so
only by lowering its payments in the no-accident state. Hence this state becomes
less attractive for the disposer, reducing its incentives to take care. Interestingly, I
find that price interaction, which has usually not been considered in the literature,
yields exactly the same outcome. The reason for this ‘degeneration’ of contracts is
the combination of a binding wealth constraint of the disposer (the principal) and a
binding participation constraint of the waste exporter (the agent).
Accordingly, contracts are advantageous over price interaction only in the absence
of wealth constraints, or if bargaining power is on the side of the waste exporter so
that its participation constraint does not bind (see Balkenborg 2001). Moreover,
in this case fully extending liability to waste exporters yields socially optimal care.
Nevertheless, the factor allocation remains inefficient. The reason is that extending
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liability to waste exporters is similar to an export tax. It introduces a distortion by
lowering the price of waste disposal for domestic producers of the consumption good,
who will use too much disposal inputs. Therefore, making waste exporters liable for
all damages that are not covered by the disposers themselves is never optimal. In
addition, an accident probability above the socially optimal level reduces marginal
returns of waste disposers, which further distorts the factor allocation. If waste
exporter liability reduces care, it may even be optimal not to extent liability at all.
I also consider how waste exporter liability affects incentives of the government in
the waste importing country to hold its domestic disposers liable. I find that a welfare
maximizing domestic regulator chooses a higher level of disposer liability if waste
exporters are also hold liable. This reflects that waste exporters will deduct their
expected liability costs from the price they pay to disposers. Therefore, disposers
have an incentive to keep these costs low. A higher level of domestic liability enables
disposers to commit to more care and, thereby, to a lower accident probability.
The paper is in line with several others that have found a partial extension of
liability to be optimal, while using different arguments (see, e.g., Boyd and Ingber-
man 1997; Boyer and Laffont 1997; Lu¨deke and Endres 1999). Only some papers
that allow for safety monitoring – an issue which is only briefly addressed in the
concluding remarks – have argued for fully extended liability (Lewis and Sappington
2001; Feess and Hege 2003). Furthermore, most authors have analyzed how extended
liability affects the care to avoid accidents for an individual project of fixed size. By
contrast, I am also interested in how the liability regime affects the factor allocation
and, therefore, activity levels. Other papers that analyze output effects are Hiriart
and Martimort (2004), Laffont (1995) as well as Dionne and Spaeter (2003), but
they use a different approach then the present paper. In the first, output effects
are due to private cost information of the seller, leading to adverse selection. In the
other two contributions, effort cost are monetary so that there is a trade-off between
devoting effort to accident prevention or to production.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on hazardous waste trade. Even
though this literature is large,3 there are only few contributions that use economic
analysis. An exception is Copeland (1991) who analysis taxes on foreign waste (see
also Rauscher 1997). However, it is straightforward to see that a liability system
is preferable to a tax on waste disposal. A tax would also have to be paid in the
no-accident case and, therefore, provides less incentives to exert care.
3See, e.g., the numerous references listed by the Basel Action Network (www.ban.org).
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The Liability Protocol to the Basel Convention is one of the very few global
environmental agreements that specify liability rules. In this respect, the Protocol is
of substantial importance for the further development of international environmental
law and politics. For examples, the analysis is relevant for the regulation of trade
in hazardous chemicals and pesticides (‘Rotterdam Convention of Prior Informed
Consent’), and for trade in living modified organisms, which is regulated in the
‘Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’. Notably, the Cartagena Protocol provides that
“the Conference of the Parties shall, at its first meeting, adopt a process with respect
to the appropriate elaboration of international rules and procedures in the field of
liability and redress for damage resulting from transboundary movements of living
modified organisms” (Article 27).4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and
determines the social optimum. Sections 3 and 4 analyze care choices if agents in-
teract through the price system and state specific contracts, respectively. In Section
5, I turn to factor allocations and determine optimal liability rules. Section 6 ana-
lyzes how extended exporter liability affects incentives for the regulator in the waste
importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Section 7 concludes.
2 A model of trade in hazardous goods
I analyze trade in hazardous waste from the perspective of a small open economy
with two production activities (see Copeland 1991). For parsimony, I assume that
there is only one primary input factor k, which may be thought of as a vector of
inputs that are used in fixed proportions. This input is used by a representative
producer of a final consumption good x = f(kx, sx).
Waste is a by-product of this production process, and the x-producer must pay
for its disposal. Accordingly, it has to use disposal services sx as a second input.
Such services are produced by a domestic disposal firm from the primary input factor
according to s = g(ks). I assume that both production functions are strictly concave
in their arguments and that f(kx, sx) exhibits constant returns to scale.
The consumption good x and disposal services s are traded at fixed world prices
px and ps, respectively. I normalize px = 1. Without taxes, liability rules or other
4The Rotterdam Convention entered into force on 24 February 2004, the Biosafety Protocol on
11 September 2003. Its first Conference of Parties established an Ad Hoc Group on Liability and
Redress, which shall complete its work in 2007.
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distortions, the domestic price for waste disposal equals the fixed world price ps.
Throughout the paper I assume that ps is sufficiently high so that the economy under
consideration is an exporter of waste disposal services. In particular, g(ks) = sx+se,
where se > 0 are exports of disposal services.
Waste disposal is harmful if and only if an accident occurs. Expected monetarized
damages are piDg(ks), where pi is the non-contractible accident probability and D ∈
R+ are damages per waste unit in the case of an accident. Disposers can reduce
the accident probability. As in the seminal contribution by Shavell (1986), I assume
that this leads to a non-pecuniary (or effort) cost per unit of waste disposal, whose
monetary equivalent is c(pi). In the concluding section I will discuss how pecuniary
costs of care that reduce the disposers’ assets would affect the results. I make
standard assumptions c′(pi) < 0, c′′(pi) > 0, limpi→0 c′(pi) = −∞ and c(1) = 0.
Finally, all parties are assumed to be risk-neutral.
To simplify the analysis and to focus on liability aspects, I assume that utility
u(·) of the representative consumer in the waste disposal country is linear in the
consumption good, in expected damages, and in non-pecuniary care costs. The
consumer spends his complete income on x. Hence, the social optimum is obtained
by maximizing u(·), subject to the economy’s income constraint, and the given factor
endowment, K (for parsimony, I always suppress the normalized price px = 1)
max
{kx,ks,sx,pi}
u(·) = x− [piD + c(pi)] g(ks) subject to (1)
x ≤ f(kx, sx)− pssx + psg(ks), (2)
kx + ks ≤ K. (3)
The r.h.s. of (2) specifies the economy’s income, which consists of revenues of
the x-firm less the costs of disposal inputs, and revenues of the disposal firm. Note
that primary inputs ks and kx constitute revenues for consumers but costs for firms
and, therefore, cancel out.
Throughout the paper, I assume that the economy does not specialize in either
x or s. Given the above model specification, the constraints will then hold with
equality. Substitution of (2) into (1) yields a concave objective function, with first
order conditions for a social optimum (for parsimony, I always omit the binding
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factor endowment constraint):
∂f(·)
∂kx
= [ps − c(pi∗)− pi∗D] ∂g(·)
∂ks
, (4)
∂f(·)
∂sx
= ps, (5)
[D + c′(pi∗)] g(·) = 0. (6)
According to (4) the marginal value of factor input k is equalized across sectors;
according to (5) the marginal value of disposal input sx equals its cost; and accord-
ing to (6) the accident probability pi∗ equalizes marginal costs and benefits of care.
In the absence of policy intervention, the private solution will obviously be subop-
timal because accident costs of waste disposal are externalized. One way to correct
this market failure is to make waste disposers fully liable for accidental damages.
However, as argued in the introduction this policy may not be feasible, especially in
developing countries. Accordingly, in the following I assume that liability of waste
disposers is limited due to either wealth constraints or regulatory liability limits.
Hence, the question arises whether liability should be extended to the firms that
make transactions with waste disposers. To focus on waste exporter liability, I
assume that this is feasible only w.r.t. waste exporters, while political constraints
make it impossible to extend liability to domestic producers of the consumption good.
This reflects that discussions in connection with the Basel Protocol on Liability and
Compensation have mainly focused on increasing responsibilities of waste exporting
countries, who often belong to the OECD. I also assume that extended liability is
limited to damages that are caused by the disposal of the exported waste. If an
unequivocal attribution of damages to a specific source is not possible, then liability
of the waste exporter is “proportional” to the share of its waste exports in the total
amount of waste disposed of (see Boyd and Ingberman 1997). Finally, I assume that
the accident probability is the same for the disposal of imported and domestic waste.
For concreteness, one may imagine that waste is disposed of in a single incineration
plant or deposited on a single landfill.
3 Accident probability with price interaction
Turning to the private solution, the sequence of events is depicted in figure 1. First,
the level of extended exporter liability is chosen. Second, waste exporter and disposer
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Figure 1: Timing in the model
decide on the price for disposal services. Third, producers of waste disposal services
and the consumption good choose factor inputs ks, kx, and sx. Fourth, the disposal
firm chooses the accident probability pi. Subsequently, with probability pi an accident
occurs, and payments are made.
By backwards induction, I begin with analyzing the waste disposer’s choice of pi.
Let E[p] be the expected unit price that the disposer receives for its services after
accounting for its own liability cost. Then its maximization problem is
max
{pi}
[E[p]− c(pi)] g(ks)− rks, (7)
where r denotes the price of input ks. Observe that the only relevant term is E[p]−
c(pi). This facilitates a comparison of the results with the literature on extended
liability, which has usually analyzed the case of an individual project of given size
(e.g., Pitchford 1995; Balkenborg 2001).
E[p] depends on the price that parties have agreed to in the second stage of the
game. As discussed in the introduction, I distinguish between liability limits that
are due to insufficient wealth and regulations, respectively. In the first case, let Fˆ
represent the disposer’s initial net wealth per waste unit disposed. The primary
factor input, ks, is paid prior to production; hence the remaining wealth is F ≡
Fˆ − r ks
g(ks)
, where ks/g(ks) is the average input use per disposal unit.
Waste exporters can always buy disposal services at the world market price ps
without facing any liability obligations. For concreteness, this may be thought of as
the price that waste exporters pay if they trade with OECD countries that use safe
disposal technologies. Accordingly, if they trade with the waste disposal country,
they will only be willing to pay ps less their expected liability costs. I denote this
price by
vp = ps − pi(T − F − vp), (8)
where pi is the anticipated accident probability, T ≥ 0 is the joint or total liability of
the disposer and the waste exporter per unit of waste, and subscript p refers to the
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scenario of price interaction. This reflects that payments are as follows. The waste
exporter pays vp to the disposer. In the accident case, the disposer uses this together
with wealth F to compensate the victims, and the waste exporter pays T − (F + vp)
to the government (or directly to the victims, which makes no difference in this
model). Observe that the setup includes the case where total liability T is lower
than disposer liability, F + vp, so that the waste exporter would receive a subsidy if
an accident occurs. Rearranging yields
vp(pi) =
ps − pi(T − F )
1− pi . (9)
Due to arbitrage and the assumption that the disposer remains an exporter of
its services at price vp, the domestic x-firm also pays vp. I restrict attention to
cases where assets of the waste disposer are insufficient to fully cover damages D.
Otherwise, strict liability of the disposer would implement the first best solution.
Assumption 1: D > F + vp(p¯i), where p¯i is the equilibrium accident probability.
Accordingly, if an accident occurs the disposer looses its complete wealth F .
Otherwise, it gets vp, yielding an expected unit payoff from disposal services
E[p] = −piF + (1− pi)vp. (10)
Upon substitution into (7), the (privately) optimal accident probability, p¯i, solves
F + vp(pi) + c
′(pi) = 0, (11)
which takes into account that vp is given when the disposer chooses pi.
Proposition 1 (Interaction through the price system).
• p¯i > pi∗, i.e. the accident probability exceeds the socially optimal level.
• dp¯i/dT > 0, i.e. the accident probability increases in the level of extended
liability.
Proof. See Appendix.
When choosing care, the disposer takes only its own liability obligations, F + vp,
into account (see 11). These are, by assumption, lower than D. We have a typical
moral hazard problem because care is exerted ex post, i.e. after waste disposal
services have been sold. Note that this problem would persist even if it were possible
to extend liability to domestic waste producers as well.
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Turning to the second statement, Pitchford (1995) has already shown that ex-
tending liability may reduce care if agents interact via contracts that condition pay-
ments on the occurrence of an accident. Proposition 1 shows that the same result
obtains if agents interact via the price system. Increasing T and, thereby, exporter
liability reduces the price vp that the disposer receives in the no-accident case, while
leaving its payoff with an accident, −F , unaffected (see 10 and 9). This reduces
incentives to avoid an accident.
It may be surprising that this holds even for T < F + vp, i.e. for the case
where the waste exporter receives a ‘subsidy’ if an accident occurs. The reason is
that the expected price which the waste exporter pays must always equal the world
market price ps (due to the assumption that the disposer represents a small country).
Accordingly, any (expected) payments that the waste exporter receives above ps –
such as the ‘subsidy’ – must be given back to the disposer. The only way to do so is
to pay a higher price in the no-accident case, thereby increasing incentives for care.
Therefore, setting T < F + vp has the same effect as a direct government subsidy of
equal size that the disposer receives in the no-accident case.
Finally, note that the expected price E[p] is the same if the disposer has unlimited
wealth, but regulatory provisions limit its liability to F + vp(p¯i). Accordingly, the
same accident probability obtains. However, in the absence of wealth limits such
an outcome is unlikely to occur because Pareto-improving, self-enforcing contracts
exist. Such contracts are analyzed in the next section.
4 Accident probability with contracts
Now I assume that waste disposers and exporters can sign contracts that condition
payments on the occurrence of an accident (see Pitchford 1995). In particular, a
waste exporter pays the waste disposer v0 if no accident occurs and v1 if an accident
occurs. Given the focus on a small country, there will be many waste exporters
competing for a contract ex ante. If contracts yield an expected price for disposal
services (after accounting for the costs of extended liability) below the world price
ps, the waste disposer can play the exporters off against each other. Therefore, I
assume that the disposer holds all the bargaining power in contract negotiations.5
As in the previous section, I first consider the case of a binding wealth limit and
5For a discussion of the role of bargaining power see Balkenborg (2001), Pitchford (1998) as well
as Demougin and Helm (2005).
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then briefly turn to regulatory liability limits. The waste disposer chooses contract
elements (v0, v1) and accident probability pi so as to maximize the expected price
for disposal services after accounting for liability and care costs – subject to the
constraints that (i) the waste exporter (weakly) prefers this contract to trading at
the world price ps, and that (ii) the accident probability as specified in the contract
is incentive compatible.
A contract v0 = v1 = vp(p¯i) would be identical to the scenario of price interaction
as analyzed in the last section. Since the waste exporter’s participation constraint
binds in this case, it will not accept a contract with v0, v1 > vp(p¯i). Furthermore,
v1 ≤ v0 as otherwise the accident state would be rewarded. Therefore, v1 ≤ vp(p¯i)
and D > F + v1 by assumption 1. Accordingly, any payments v1 that the disposer
receives in the accident state are drawn upon for liability claims. This yields an
expected price of disposal services after accounting for liability of
E[p] = −piF + (1− pi)v0. (12)
Hence the incentive compatible accident probability solves (11) if one replaces vp
by v0. Furthermore, the waste exporter will only participate if its expected payments
to the disposer, (1−pi)v0+piv1, plus expected cost of extended liability, pi(T−F−v1),
do not exceed the world price ps. It is straightforward to show that the participation
constraint binds (otherwise the disposer would demand a higher price). This yields
(9), replacing vp by v0. Accordingly, the solution is determined by the same equation
system as with price interaction, and vp = v0 ≡ v.
Proposition 2 (Interaction through contracts, binding wealth constraint). The pri-
vately optimal contract induces the same accident probability as price interaction.
Accordingly, the effect identified by Pitchford (1995) – that care may decrease
in extended liability – arises only because contracts are ‘degenerate’ in the sense
that they replicate the situation with price interaction. The reason for this is the
combination of a binding participation and wealth constraint. If we reversed the
allocation of bargaining power, then the waste exporter’s participation constraint
would (usually) not bind and he would respond to a higher T by inducing the disposer
to take more care (see Balkenborg 2001). Alternatively, if the wealth constraint did
not bind, i.e. if F + v1 were not completely drawn upon for liability claims, then
increases in v0 could be offset by reductions in v1.
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Taking up the latter case, suppose that the disposer has unlimited wealth. How-
ever, there is a regulatory liability limit of exactly the same size as at the end of
the previous section, i.e. of F + vp(p¯i). After accounting for liability costs, it then
receives an expected price for its services of
E[p] = (1− pi)v0n + piv1n − pi[F + vp(p¯i)], (13)
where subscript n refers to the no wealth constraint scenario. Furthermore, expected
costs of extended liability for the waste exporter are pi[T − F − vp(p¯i)], so that the
participation constraint becomes E[p] + piT ≤ ps. It is straightforward to show
that the optimal accident probability will solve the first order condition (see, e.g.,
Pitchford 1995)
−T − c′(pi) = 0. (14)
The next result follows straightforwardly from (14), and comparing it with (6).
Proposition 3 (Interaction through contracts, no wealth constraint). The accident
probability decreases in the level of extended liability, and fully extending liability
upon waste exporters induces the socially optimal accident probability.
5 Factor allocation and optimal liability rules
I now turn to the choice of factor inputs. In the previous sections, I have dis-
tinguished between four cases along the following two lines: price versus contract
interaction, and limited wealth versus regulatory liability limits. In all four cases,
appropriate substitution shows that the disposer receives an expected unit payoff of
E[p] = ps − piT , though pi may differ across cases. Intuitively, the waste exporter
will shift its expected costs from extended liability to the disposer as it can always
trade at the world market price ps. Accordingly, the waste disposer chooses factor
input ks so as to
6
max
{ks}
[ps − piT − c(pi)] g(ks)− rks, (15)
with first order condition
[ps − piT − c(pi)]∂g(·)
∂ks
− dpi
dks
[T + c′(pi)]
∂g(·)
∂ks
= r. (16)
6The assumption that the waste disposer exports its services can now be concretized. It requires
that the unit payoff from selling to the international market, ps − piT − c(pi), exceeds the domestic
market clearing price. This will always be the case if ps is sufficiently large.
12
The second term on the l.h.s. arises since changes in ks affect disposer wealth
per waste unit, F ≡ Fˆ − r ks
g(ks)
, which in turn affects pi. This effect will be negligible
if the average input use per disposal unit, ks/g(ks), changes only by a negligible
amount as ks is marginally increased. In the following, I assume that this is the
case so that the second term can be neglected. Observe that it is equal to zero with
constant unit cost.7 More generally, it is small if the production function g(ks) is
not very curved and if output is relatively large. Without this simplification, the
following elaborations would depend on third order derivatives in a rather complex
way, making the analysis untractable.
Turning to the domestic x-firm, denote by νs the price that it pays for waste
disposal services. After accounting for liability costs, the disposer’s expected unit
payoff from selling to the x-firm is (1−pi)νs−piF . Due to arbitrage, this must equal
the expected unit payoff from selling to waste exporters, i.e.
(1− pi)νs − piF = ps − piT. (17)
Comparing this with (9), it follows that νs = v(pi). Hence the profit maximization
problem of the domestic x-firm becomes
max
{kx,sx}
f(kx, sx)− v(pi)sx − rkx, (18)
with first order conditions w.r.t. factor inputs
∂f(·)
∂kx
= r, (19)
∂f(·)
∂sx
= v(pi). (20)
As in the social optimum (eqs. 4 to 6), the marginal value of factor input k is
equalized across sectors (see 16 and 19), and the marginal value of disposal input sx
equals its cost. However, these marginal values may differ from the social optimum
for two reasons: firstly, the accident probability, as given by (11) and (14), may be
suboptimal; secondly, v(pi) may differ from ps.
Proposition 4 If the disposer is judgement-proof, i.e. F + v(p¯i) < D, then the
private solution is always suboptimal.
7Obviously, it is also zero for the case of contracts and no wealth limits, for which T +c′(pi) = 0.
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Proof. From propositions 1, 2 and 3, care is too low except for the case of
contracts and no wealth constraints, where T = D induces efficient care. However,
by assumption 1 this implies T > F + v(p¯i) so that v(p¯i) < ps (by 8). Comparing (5)
and (20), the marginal product of disposal inputs in the x-sector will be too low. 2
Intuitively, the first best outcome could be achieved with full disposer liability
and no extended liability, F + ps ≥ D = T , as this would completely internalize the
externality. However, assumption 1 excludes this case. By contrast, if liability is
partially shifted to waste exporters, this reduces the equilibrium price for disposal
inputs. Domestic x-producers benefit from this reduced price without being liable
themselves. Hence they will use too many disposal inputs. This effect of extended
exporter liability is similar to an export tax.
Given proposition 4, the question for the optimal extent of waste exporter lia-
bility arises.8 In particular, I am looking for the T that maximizes utility of the
representative consumer – as given by (1) – subject to the income constraint
x = f(kx, sx)−v(pi)sx+[ps−piT ]g(ks)+pi[F +v(pi)]g(ks)+pi[T −F −v(pi)]se. (21)
The first two terms are the income of the x-sector less costs for disposal inputs.
The third term is the income of the waste disposal sector after accounting for the
reduced price due to extended liability and own liability. The fourth and fifth term
represent income from liability claims against domestic waste disposers and waste
exporters, respectively. Note that the income constraint is the same in all four cases
analyzed in Sections 3 and 4, though evaluated for different accident probabilities.9
Substitution of (21) into (1) and total differentiation w.r.t. T yields10
du(·)
dT
= −pi(D − T ) dg
dT
− pi[T − (F + v(pi))]dsx
dT
− [D + c′(pi)] dpi
dT
g. (22)
Three effects are associated with an increase of waste exporter liability. Firstly,
disposal is reduced because the disposer receives a lower price (dg/dT < 0, see
8See Copeland (1991) for a similar problem with taxes on foreign waste as the optimization
variable.
9With contracts the disposer receives no payment in the accident case from waste exporters that
can be drawn upon for liability. Accordingly, the income from liability claims is pi[F + v(pi)]sx +
piFse + pi(T − F )se. The first two terms are the income from liability of disposal firms if they sell
to the x-sector and waste exporters, respectively. The final term is income from extended liability.
Rearranging the expression, it is identical to the last two terms in (21).
10To obtain this, note that dkx = −dks due the fixed factor endowment and use the equilibrium
conditions for factor inputs, assuming that dpi/dks ≈ 0.
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Appendix). Accordingly, also damages that are not covered by liability decrease.
Secondly, the domestic x-sector now faces a lower price for waste disposal inputs and
will increase their usage (dsx/dT > 0, see Appendix). To the extent that liability for
the disposal of domestic waste is lower than for imported waste, this reduces utility.
Thirdly, extending liability affects the equilibrium accident probability. With price
interaction, this effect is negative. With contracts, it is negative with a binding
wealth constraint and positive else (see propositions 1 to 3).
In the optimum du(·)/dT = 0. Solving for the optimal exporter liability, thereby
using dsx = dg − dse, yields
T ∗ − [F + v(pi)] = (D − [F + v(pi)]) dg/dT
dse/dT
+
dpi
dT
[D + c′(pi)] g
pi
dse/dT
, (23)
where T ∗ denotes the (privately) optimal level of total liability. Assuming that the
second order condition holds, the next result follows.11
Proposition 5 Fully extending liability to the waste exporter is never optimal, i.e.
T ∗ < D. Except for the case of contracts and unlimited wealth, the optimal extension
may even be negative, i.e. T ∗ − [F + v(pi)] ≤ 0 is possible. Furthermore, optimal
extended liability is higher with contracts – compared to price interaction – if and
only if there is no binding wealth constraint.
Proof. See Appendix.
Extending liability to waste exporters reduces the price for domestic disposal
services sx and, thereby, distorts the factor allocation in a similar way as an export
tax. In particular, dsx/dT > 0 implies that
dg/dT
dse/T
∈ (0, 1) in (23). Therefore, T ∗ < D
even in the most optimistic scenario of contracts and unlimited wealth, for which
the last term in (23) would be zero with T ∗ = D.
As explained after equation (22), two further effects determine the optimal level
of extended liability. In particular, it tends to be lower if the disposal sector does
not contract much as T is increased, i.e. if dg/dT is low. It is further reduced if a
higher T induces a substantial increase in the accident probability, i.e. if dpi/dT is
large. If this is effect is strong, it may even be optimal to set T ∗ < F + v(pi), since
this induces the waste exporter to pay the disposer a bonus in the no-accident state
(see the discussion after proposition 1).
11From the expressions for dks/dT and dsx/dT in the appendix it is straightforward to see that
the second order condition depends on third order derivatives in a non-trivial way.
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6 Exporter versus disposer liability
In the previous section, I have analyzed the optimal extension of liability to waste
exporters, i.e. T − [F + v(pi)]. In the real world, regulators often have at least some
discretion in choosing domestic liability. This is most obvious if F is a regulatory
liability limit. In addition, even if F represents available wealth, the regulator may
be able to influence it; for example by denying firms with insufficient wealth a licence
for waste disposal or by stipulating obligatory insurance.
However, increasing domestic liability will usually be costly. In particular, the
regulator may face fierce political lobbying by waste disposers, or it may be difficult
to enforce due liability payments.12 To represent this effect, I now assume that
making domestic waste disposers liable involves costs θ(F ) for the regulator, with
θ′(F ) > 0, θ′′(F ) ≥ 0. This also provides an explicit argument for the assumption of
limited disposer liability as used in the preceding sections.
How will the extension of liability to waste exporters affect the domestic regu-
lator’s choice of F? One might worry that governments perceive extended liability
as a way to protect their domestic industry at the expense of waste exporters, while
still assuring cover for damages that accrue domestically. In this scenario, waste ex-
porter liability would have a negative effect on incentives to impose domestic liability.
However, as the following proposition shows, the opposite is the case.13
Proposition 6 (Price interaction and contract interaction with wealth constraints).
Consider a waste importing country that disposes one unit of waste of the exporting
country. The domestic regulator’s incentive to raise waste disposer liability increases
in the level of waste exporter liability, i.e. dF/dT > 0, provided that c′′′(pi) is not
too large.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. It has already been mentioned that the waste
exporter, who can always buy disposal services at the world market price ps, shifts
12Obviously, in the absence of such costs a welfare maximizing domestic regulator would fully
internalize damages by employing a rule of strict disposer liability and requiring F + ps ≥ D.
13I restrict attention on a single waste disposal project and abstain from an analysis of activity
levels because they depend on T and F in a very complex way. However, it seems that an incor-
poration of effects on activity levels would further strengthen the result. In particular, it has been
argued above that T > F + v(pi) distorts the factor allocation because the domestic x-firm pays a
lower price for waste disposal than the waste exporter. The higher T , the greater the incentives to
raise F so as to reduce this distortion.
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any cost from extended liability to the domestic disposer. Therefore, the disposer
benefits if it can commit to a lower accident probability pi. In the cases of price
interaction and contract interaction with wealth constraints, the only way to do so
is via a higher level of domestic liability because the equilibrium level of care is
determined by F + v(pi) + c′(pi) = 0. The higher T , the higher the price increase
that the disposer obtains due to a lower accident probability.
Finally, note that in the case of contract interaction with unlimited wealth, the
domestic regulator would choose F = 0 independent of the level of T . The reason
is that imposing a positive level of F is costly, while it does not reduce the accident
probability (see 14).
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the extension of liability for damages of hazardous waste
disposal to the exporters of such waste. Essentially, an extension of liability has
three effects. Firstly, it leads to a contraction of the disposal sector, which is always
positive if damages exceed the joint liability of waste disposers and exporters. Sec-
ondly, it affects the disposers’ choice of care to prevent accidents. Thirdly, since it
becomes more expensive to export disposal services, their domestic price falls in a
small open economy. Accordingly, domestic producers increase the input of disposal
services. In a more complex model, pollution intensive industries would benefit most
from the lower disposal price. Though imports of hazardous waste would decrease,
the country would become more attractive for pollution intensive industries.
Four different cases have been considered. Only in the case of contracts and
unlimited wealth, the optimal extension of liability is always positive. However,
even here it is only partial. In the other cases that have been considered – price
interaction and contracts with limited wealth – the optimal extension of liability is
higher if this leads to a large contraction of the damaging disposal sector, without
increasing the accident probability too much. In principle, it may even be optimal
to choose a negative level of extended liability. The intuition is that in a small
open economy this resembles a subsidy which the disposer receives in the accident
free state. Such a direct subsidy has not been considered in the model, but from a
policy point of view it certainly seems much more realistic than ‘subsidizing’ waste
exporters.
A positive effect of extending liability to waste exporters is that it usually in-
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creases incentives to hold domestic disposers liable. Nevertheless, the overall con-
clusion from the analysis is that quests to extend liability to exporters of hazardous
goods should be treated with caution. If domestic firms that use the hazardous
goods are judgement-proof, partial exporter liability may be welfare improving in
some cases, but in others it is not.
A further result that has been obtained concerns the comparison of price in-
teraction and interaction via state specific contracts. If a waste disposer’s wealth
constraint binds, then the two are actually equivalent and lead to the same accident
probability.
An issue which has not been addressed is monitoring (see Feess 1999). For
example, the disposer may allow the waste exporter to monitor its disposal activities,
resulting in a signal whether the disposer has taken due care or not (Milgrom 1981).
In the case of a bad signal, the disposer pays a fine to the waste exporter. A bad signal
may arise also in the no-accident case, where the disposer’s wealth limit does not
bind. Therefore, such a scheme offers the disposer the possibility to commit to a lower
accident probability by increasing the costs of too little care. Obviously, disposers
have an incentive to do so only in the case of extended liability, in which they have
to compensate waste exporters for the expected costs from extended liability.
A final caveat concerns the costs of care of a judgement-proof disposer. If these
costs are pecuniary, then they reduce the assets with which the disposer is liable
for damages. Effectively, care costs are paid only in the no-accident state. This
increases incentives too take care, which may even be above the first best level (see
Beard 1990 and Posey 1993). Nevertheless, waste exporters would still demand
compensation for extended liability, and this compensation could be paid only in
the no-accident state. Therefore, extended exporter liability would still increase the
accident probability, counteracting the effect of monetary care costs. Accordingly,
monetary care costs and the possibility of monitoring both seem to strengthen the
argument for extending liability to waste exporters.
8 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. The first statement follows straightforwardly from a com-
parison of (6) and (11), thereby noting assumption 1. For T ≤ F + ps, the second
statement follows from implicit differentiation of (11). For T > F + ps, it is proved
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along the lines of proposition 2(ii) in Pitchford (1995). Define
h(pi, T ) ≡ F + vp + c′(pi) (24)
and suppose ∃ pi = pi0 such that h(pi0, T ) > 0. Given the assumptions on c′(pi), then
∃ p¯i ∈ (0, pi0) such that (see Lemma A1 in Pitchford 1995)
p¯i(T ) ≡ min{pi|h(pi, T ) = 0}. (25)
From (9) one obtains ps > vp for T > F + ps so that
h(pi, T ) < F + ps + c
′(pi). (26)
As limpi→0 c′(pi) = −∞ by assumption, the right hand side is always negative for
sufficiently small pi. Accordingly, for any T ∃pi < p¯i(T ) such that h(pi, T ) < 0. Now
suppose that, in contradiction to proposition 1, p¯i(T ) is not increasing in T , i.e. for
some T2 > T1 suppose p¯i2 ≡ p¯i(T2) ≤ p¯i(T1) ≡ p¯i1. As ∂h(·)/∂T < 0 and h(p¯i, T ) = 0,
h(p¯i2, T1) > h(p¯i2, T2) = 0 > h(pi, T1) (27)
By the intermediate value theorem ∃pi ∈ [pi, p¯i2] such that h(pi, T1) = 0. However,
p¯i1 ≥ p¯i2 if p¯i(T ) is not increasing in T . Hence, this pi cannot be the p¯i(T1) that solves
min{pi|h(pi, T1) = 0}, a contradiction. 2
Proof that dg/dT < 0 and dsx/dT > 0. The endogenous variables, ks, kx, sx, r, and
pi are defined by the first order conditions to the firms’ maximization problems (15
and 18), full employment of factor endowments and the conditions determining the
accident probability. It has been argued after eq. (16) that pi is independent of
the other endogenous variables, provided that the marginal effect of ks on average
input use per disposal unit is negligible; hence I abstract from the equations that
determine it for the moment. Applying Cramer’s rule to the remaining equation
system then yields
dks
dT
=
[pi + (T + c′(pi)) dpi
dT
] dg
dks
∂2f
∂s2x
+ dv
dT
∂2f
∂sx∂kx
[ps − piT − c(pi)] d2gdk2s
∂2f
∂s2x
+ ∂
2f
∂k2x
∂2f
∂s2x
−
(
∂2f
∂sx∂kx
)2 . (28)
Given the assumption that f(kx, sx) is homogeneous of degree one in its argu-
ments, by Euler’s theorem ∂
2f
∂k2x
∂2f
∂s2x
=
(
∂2f
∂sx∂kx
)2
. Accordingly, the denominator of
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(28) is clearly positive. Turning to the numerator, the effect of T on pi has to be
taken into account. Applying the chain rule to (9) yields
d
dT
v(p¯i(T ), T ) = − p¯i
1− p¯i +
ps − (T − F )
(1− p¯i)2
dp¯i
dT
. (29)
By proposition 1, dp¯i/dT > 0. For T − (F + v) ≥ 0, substitution for v from (9)
yields
(1− p¯i)(T − F )− [ps − p¯i(T − F )]
1− p¯i ≥ 0 =⇒ ps − (T − F ) ≤ 0 (30)
so that dv/dT < 0. Next, suppose T − (F + v) < 0. Implicit differentiation of (11)
yields
dp¯i
dT
=
p¯i(1− p¯i)
ps − (T − F ) + c′′(p¯i)(1− p¯i)2 . (31)
Upon substitution into (29), dv/dT < 0 since
p¯i
1− p¯i >
(
ps − (T − F )
(1− p¯i)2
)(
p¯i(1− p¯i)
ps − (T − F ) + c′′(p¯i)(1− p¯i)2
)
. (32)
Turning to the first term in the numerator of (28), in the case of contracts and
no wealth constraints, T + c′(pi) = 0 (see 14). For the three other cases, suppose
v + F ≤ T . Using (11) yields T + c′(p¯i) ≥ 0. If v + F > T , the sign is reversed
and T + c′(p¯i) < 0. Dividing the numerator and denominator of (31) by (1− p¯i) and
substitution then yields
p¯i + [T + c′(p¯i)]
dp¯i
dT
= p¯i − [T + c
′(p¯i)]p¯i
T + c′(p¯i)− c′′(p¯i)(1− p¯i) > 0. (33)
Finally, by homogeneity of degree 1, ∂
2f
∂sx∂kx
> 0 so that (28) is clearly negative,
and
dg
dT
=
dg
dks
dks
dT
< 0. (34)
Again using Cramer’s rule,
dsx
dT
=
[ps − piT − c(pi)] d2gdk2s
dv
dT
+ [pi + (T + c′(pi)) dpi
dT
] dg
dks
∂2f
∂sx∂kx
+ ∂
2f
∂k2x
dv
dT
[ps − piT − c(pi)] d2gdk2s
∂2f
∂s2x
> 0 (35)
by the above arguments. 2
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Proof of proposition 5. Above it has been shown that dg/dT < 0 and dsx/dT > 0.
Since dse = dg− dsx, this implies dg/dTdse/dT ∈ (0, 1) so that first term on the right hand
side of (23) is always smaller than D − (F + v). In the case of price interaction
and/or a binding wealth limit – for which dp¯i/dT > 0 and D+c′(p¯i) > 0 – the second
term further reduces optimal extended liability. If this effect is large, the r.h.s. may
become negative.
Turning to the case of contracts and unlimited wealth, dpi/dT < 0 so that the
r.h.s. is positive for all T < D. Finally, in contradiction to proposition 5, assume
that T ∗ ≥ D. From proposition 3 this implies pi ≤ pi∗ so that D + c′(pi) ≤ 0.
Hence the second term on the right hand side of (23) can not be positive, and
D− (F + v) > T ∗− (F + v) – a contradiction. The last statement in the proposition
is obvious. 2
Proof of proposition 6. The regulator’s problem of choosing F is
max
F
x− c(pi)− piD − θ(F ) subject to (36)
x = ps − piT + pi(F + v) + pi[T − (F + v)], (37)
where the first two terms represent disposer profits and the other terms the income
from liability claims against domestic disposer and waste exporter. The first order
condition to this problem, and equation (11) that solves for the accident probability,
determine the endogenous variables pi, F . These two equations can be written as
ps + F − piT + c′(pi)(1− pi) = 0 (38)
[c′(pi) +D]
dpi
dF
+ θ′(F ) = 0. (39)
Implicit differentiation of (38) yields
dpi
dT
= −pi dpi
dF
= − pi
T − c′′(pi)(1− pi) + c′(pi) > 0, (40)
where the sign follows from proposition 1. Upon substitution, (39) can be written
as
c′(pi) +D + [T − c′′(pi)(1− pi) + c′(pi)]θ′(F ) = 0. (41)
Implicit differentiation then yields
dF
dT
=
− [c′′(pi) + [2c′′(pi)− c′′′(pi)(1− pi)] θ′(F )] dpi
dT
− θ′(F )
[c′′(pi) + [2c′′(pi)− c′′′(pi)(1− pi)] θ′(F )] dpi
dF
+ θ′′(F ) [T + c′(pi)− c′′(pi)(1− pi)] .
(42)
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Using (40), the numerator and the denominator are both negative, provided that
c′′′(pi) does not have a very large positive value. 2
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